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The Commander Naval Communications Command has been designated
as the Executive Manager for Naval Communications throughout the De-
partment of the Navy. None the less, mere designation has not gained
complete acceptance or understanding of his role. At least part of the
problem appears to be the title "Executive Manager" itself. This thesis
attempts to define that title and explore the authority and responsibility
relationships inherent or implied in such a title.
The thesis discusses a brief history of communications management,
defines the term "Executive Manager" and describes the need for such an
individual in the Navy. The present organization for communications in
the Navy is contrasted with Army and Air Force organizations. Finally
the authority and responsibility relationships are discussed and conclu-
sions are drawn which describe what is considered to be the best form





B. NEED FOR THIS STUDY 7
C. PURPOSE 8
D. METHODOLOGY 8
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT 9
A. ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY 9
B. THE EMERGENCE OF COMNAVCOMM 12
III. THE EXECUTIVE MANAGER 16
A. DEFINITION 16
B. NEED 18
IV. COMMUNICATIONS ORGANIZATIONS 21
A. THE PRESENT NAVY ORGANIZATION 21
B. ARMY AND AIR FORCE 26
V. AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY RELATIONSHIPS 30
A. AUTHORITY 30
B. RESPONSIBILITY 32
VI. CONCLUSIONS ' 36
LIST OF REFERENCES 38
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 41




All organizations undergo change. In recent years the organization of
the United States Navy has undergone dramatic change. This change has
been seen in both the structure of the organization and in the titles ap-
plied to various segments of the organization. Unfortunately change is
not always accepted and at times it is simply not understood. Bureau-
cratic organizations seem to stand for rigid rules and regulations, a hier-
archy of offices, impersonality and resistance to change. The ability to
cope with change in the Navy is complicated by factors of geography and
the multiple eschelons of command which impose a natural communica-
tions filter between the highest levels where members of the organization
assume change is conceived, and the lowest levels where it must be
dealt with. As further evidence of complication, Webster defines "bu-
reaucracy" as "the administration of government through departments and
subdivisions managed by sets of officials following an inflexible routine . "
The words inflexible routine imply the lack of change. None the less,
change has occurred in Navy organization.
One manifestation of this is the evolutionary process which has taken
place in naval communications since the establishment of the post of
Superintendent, Naval Radio Service in 1912. This process has followed
the technological changes that have taken place in communications since
the early days of wireless. In recent years the expansion of communications
in the United States can best be described as explosive. The cost of

communications in the military accounts for a large portion of the defense
budget. It has been estimated that more than nine billion dollars has been
invested in communications systems and equipment, and that annual expendi-
tures for communications support exceed five billion dollars [Ref. 20, p. 20]
The expansion of communications to this degree has not been without
changes in the mode of operation and management or a lack of public
notice and examination. Among the salient events of recent years which
exemplify or show the need for increased emphasis on the role of communi-
cations management are the following:
a. The establishment of a Telecommunications Advisor in the office
of the President of the United States.
b. The establishment of Telecommunications committees in both
houses of Congress, reflecting the interest of the electorate in com-
munications-electronics programs of the federal government.
c. The establishment of a National Communications System by Execu-
tive Order, consisting of a confederation of the communications systems
of Federal Departments and Agencies.
d. The establishment within the Department of Defense of:
(1) A Defense Communications System under a Defense Communi-
cations Agency to' provide for the world-wide communications and
information exchange requirements of all Department of Defense
users.
(2) A Joint Tactical Communication office to coordinate development
of joint tactical communications systems and equipment.

(3) An Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) to act
as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense on Tele-
communications matters and for the National Communications System
and also to have primary staff responsibility for the World-Wide
Military Command and Control System.
e. The spectacular achievements of NASA telecommunications in space
exploration including world-wide exploitation of telecommunications
programs from the moon and deep space probes.
f. The near-revolutionary, government and industry-wide computer
connected programs which increasingly require the integration of and
transmission of information with data processing and data management
into one telecommunications/teleprocessing field of endeavor.
g. The tragic failures of the Defense Communications System which
were associated with the USS Liberty incident in June 1967, the USS
Pueblo loss in January 1968 and the EC-121 loss in April 1969.
Factors such as these, the enormous dollar investment, and the vital
necessity to maintain responsive communications while operating in a
nuclear environment have produced Congressional pressure for DOD and
the individual services to speak with one voice 'in matters relating to
communications. Toward this end, a Naval Communications Command
was established by the Secretary of the Navy on 1 July 1967 [Ref. 37].
In furtherance of this the Chief of Naval Operations defined the mission
of the Naval Communications Command in OPNAV NOTICE 5450 of 24 May
1967 and later in OPNAV NOTICE 5450 of 24 June 1968. In May of 1971 ,

the Chief of Naval Operations refined the mission and functions of the
Commander, Naval Communications Command in OPNAV INSTRUCTION
5450.184. In this document, the Commander, Naval Communications
Command (COMNAVCOMM) is assigned the mission to serve as the Execu-
tive Manager throughout the Department of the Navy.
B. NEED FOR THIS STUDY
Although the intention of this sweeping assignment seems clear on
the surface, it appears that at various levels throughout the Department
of the Navy the term Executive Manager is not understood and the authority
and responsibility relationships inherent or implied in the title are not
accepted. Indeed, the idea for a thesis to examine the need for an
Executive Manager for Naval Communications was generated at the Naval
Communications Command headquarters level. It was suggested that the
term Executive Manager is not defined and has an ambiguous connotation.
For example, the term is not found in JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, nor in Webster's Dictionary. Additionally a brief
examination of Department of the Navy organization manuals and key
personnel charts illustrates the complexity of the problem when one ob-
serves the numerous titles which imply some degree of communications
policy-level authority and responsibility. This condition not only com-
plicates the problem of acceptance of the authority and responsibility of
the one Executive Manager throughout the Navy, but severely hampers the




It is the primary purpose of this thesis to define the term Executive
Manager and the authority and responsibility relationships inherent or im-
plied in the title. Also, the need for an Executive Manager for Naval
Communications will be discussed. Secondarily, since no single source
provides it, this thesis is intended to provide an outline of the existing
structure for communications in the Department of the Navy. It is antici-
pated that the thesis will then be of use to Communications Managers,
both novice and with several years experience.
D. METHODOLOGY
In order to achieve the intended purpose of this thesis the following
procedure will be followed. First a brief history of the development of
naval communications management will be given, culminating in the
designation of COMNAVCOMM as Executive Manager. Second, the term
Executive Manager will be defined and the need for such a manager will
be discussed. Third, the organization of the Navy will be examined with
emphasis placed on the various commands or offices involved in communi-
cations matters. Comparisons with Army and Air Force organizations will
be offered. Finally, by drawing on current management literature as well
as the foundation established in the preceeding steps, the authority and
responsibility relationships inherent or implied in the office, Executive
Manager for naval communications, will be discussed.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT
A. ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY
When did it all begin? When radio was still a wild idea, when the
flag lieutenant was actually in charge of flags. It all started when
Guglielmo Marconi came to the United States in 1899 to send on the scene
reports of the America Cup race to the New York Herald. The U. S. Navy,
at the request of the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, appointed a board
of four officers to witness and report on the operation of the Marconi
equipment. Marconi's radio reporting of the races was a complete success
and he was invited to demonstrate his equipment to the U. S. Navy. At
this time a U. S. Navy Wireless Telegraph Board was appointed to in-
vestigate the equipment which was to be tested in the USS New York,
USS Massachusetts and USS Porter. The first radio message was trans-
mitted from the USS New York on 2 November 1899. The Wireless Tele-
graph Board recommended the system be given a trial by the Navy and an
offer was made to Marconi to purchase 20 sets of the equipment. Marconi
countered with an offer to lease the equipment which the Navy refused.
From that time until late 1902 the Navy sat on the side-line and watched.
In 1902 the Wireless Telegraph board was again convened to select the
best suited equipment from four European firms. The initial selection was
made and the U.S. Navy entered the radio world.
In 1903 the Radio Division of the Bureau of Equipment was established.
A school was formed in the Brooklyn Navy Yard to provide instruction in

radio operation and maintenance and "Instructions for the Use of Wireless
Telegraph Apparatus" were prepared and issued. By 1905, as the number
of ships equipped with radio equipment steadily grew, the Wireless Tele-
graph Board was disbanded and the Radio Division of the Bureau of Equip-
ment remained the sole agency to decide on matters concerning radio.
This single handed grip on communications matters was lost in 1908 when
the U. S. Navy Radio Research laboratory was established. Research was
vitally necessary to a sound expansion of naval communications. But a
problem was created. With this act authority and responsibility conflicts
began to appear since both agencies could recommend on the adequacy of
radio equipment. In fact one of the U. S. Navy Radio Research Labora-
tory's first acts was to recommend against the purchase of a specific type
of equipment. As a result the installation of continuous wave transmitters
was delayed four years. As further example Captain Howeth, in his de-
tailed account of Naval Communications [Ref. 5, p. 61], states that:
"One of the greatest deterrents to the early rapid development
of naval communications was the lack of a close knit organization.
Ashore, the stations were under the military command of the com-
mandant of the naval yard or station closest to them. Operationally
they were responsible both to that commandant and to the Chief of
the Bureau of Equipment, through the head of its Radio Division.
Afloat they were militarily and operationally ^responsible to the
senior commander, via the chain of command."
Later, it will be pointed out that even to this day the communica-
tions stations are still operated under a dual leadership. In fact, those
stations with Defense Communications Agency functions must be respon-
sive to three commanders.
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In 1910 the Bureau of Equipment was dissolved and the responsi-
bility for radio was transferred to the Bureau of Steam Engineering, as un-
likely as that may seem. In 1912 the office of Superintendent of Naval
Radio Service was established under the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation
for the purpose of operating and administering government radio stations.
Material and budgetary functions remained with the Bureau of Steam Engi-
neering. The year 1916 witnessed the further refinement of communica-
tions management when U. S. Naval General Order 236 directed the estab-
lishment of the Naval Communications Service headed by a Director. The
Director, Naval Communications, was attached to the staff of the Chief
of Naval Operations. It is interesting to note, that no mission was as-
signed to the Naval Communications Service, but the duties of the Direc-
tor were contained in the "Communications Regulations for the United
States Navy, 1918." The duties, quoted by Howeth [Ref. 5, p. 234], of
the Director reflected the conditions that existed at that time, but they
also foretold the future organization.
"In the administration of all means of communication he will have
general charge of their operation, personnel, organization, adminis-
tration, etc. , and in fact everything which has to do with the Com-
munications Service of the Navy, except material."
i
"Except material," — it seems hard to imagine the president of RCA,
ITT, or Western Union operating their companies under similar conditions.
However, it was on this basis that Naval Communications has grown.
Essentially the Director of Naval Communications (DNC) was an operator.
He had only limited influence on the material resources with which he was
11

to operate. The agencies which supplied equipment did not have to oper-
ate it. This fragmentation of responsibility began in the earliest stages
of Naval Communications history and has continued until the present.
While charged in broad and general terms for all matters relating to com-
munications the bounds of the office have been clearly limited by the
existence of a substantial influence in communication matters by the
Naval Material Command.
Be THE EMERGENCE OF COMNAVCOMM
The title Director, Naval Communications continued until 1959 when
the dual role of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications)/
Director, Naval Communications was assigned. The mission spelled out
his requirement to act as the single communications executive for CNO
and as such he was advisor, coordinator, provider, implementor, and
operator within the Navy on all matters involving naval communications,
for command and control. Simultaneously, the Naval Communications
System Headquarters was established to carry out the management re-
sponsibilities of the ACNO (COMM)/DNC. Through the early 1960's the
organization remained relatively static. However, developments external
to the Department of the Navy such as establishing the Defense Communi-
cations System (1960) and the National Communications System (1962) and
and increased emphasis on concepts of centralized command and control




It was at this point that the present Naval Communications Command
was formed. The guidance given at that time by the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations [Ref. 25], was that as many operating functions as feasible
should be removed from the CNO staff. He further stated that:
".
. .the charter of the Commander Naval Communications Command
should not be limited to command support and field activities. The
Director of Naval Communications is concerned also with several
other tasks, e.g. , satisfying the communications needs for ships
and shore activities Navy-wide. To the greatest extent practicable,
the Commander, Naval Communications Command rather than the
ACNO (COMM) should carry out those functions. This is somewhat
parallelto the fact that overall Navy military personnel management
matters are done by the Chief of Naval Personnel rather than by OP-01."
Accordingly, the Naval Communications Command and the Naval
Communications Command Headquarters were established effective 1 July
1967 to carry out the tasks outlined by the VCNO.
Some confusion has developed over the SECNAV NOTICES involved
in this establishment. SECNAV NOTICE 5450 serial 486 of 19 April 1967
has as its subject "Headquarters, Naval Communications Command; es-
tablishment of." It establishes a shore (field) activity assigned to the
Chief of Naval Operations for command, effective 1 July 1967. It speaks
only to the Headquarters. The second notice, SECNAV NOTICE 5450
serial 487 of 19 April 1967 has as its subject "Naval Communications
Command; activation of."' Reference 21, Annex A, Appendix I, p. 2,
suggests that:
"This notice did not repeat the "shore (field) activity" status of the
Command, nor did it use the expression "assigned to the Chief of
Naval Operations for command." This second SECNAV NOTICE of the
same day announced that "the Naval Communications Command, under
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"a Commander reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations,
shall be activated 1 July 1967." The change in emphasis between
these two NOTICES is subtle, but meaningful."
On the surface this implies some form of skulduggery was afoot --
as though an effort was underway to delimit the authority of the Comman-
der Naval Communications Command by those issuing the notices. The
change in emphasis is indeed meaningful, but not at all subtle. It seems
to have escaped the author of the report, that the two notices deal with
different subjects, the Naval Communications Command and the Head-
quarters, Naval Communications Command. The Naval Communications
Command is larger, or should be, than just its Headquarters. In fact,
the second notice clearly states the Naval Communications Command shall
comprise a "Headquarters and assigned shore (field) activities." In the
broad case the man and his mission to exercise authority, under the
policy guidance of the Chief of Naval Operations, over the readiness and
operating efficiency of naval communications throughout the Department
of the Navy described. In the other case the Headquarters organization
which will serve the man in the execution of his mission is discussed.
This position is supported by OPNAV NOTICE 5450 of 29 June 1968 which
repeats the mission of Commander Naval Communications Command, but
adds the mission of the Headquarters, Naval Communications Command,
that is, "to assist the Commander, Naval Communicatior Command in
accomplishing his mission."
Although the SECNAV NOTICES were issued in 1967, the complete
mission and functions statement for COMNAVCOMM was not forthcoming
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until mid-1971, over four years later. Perhaps this extraordinary delay
is due to the fact that a larger reorganization of the office of the CNO
was underway. One of the significant developments of this reorganiza-
tion affecting Naval Communications was the establishment of the Com-
mand Support Programs office which incorporated a communications
division, intelligence division, reconnaissance, surveillance and flag
plot division, signal exploitation and security division and a meteorology
division. Obviously under such a comprehensive shake-up it would take
some time for a finalized mission and functions definition to be promul-
gated. In any event on 3 May 1971, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5450.184 was
issued giving a modified mission to Commander, Naval Communications
Command. According to this instruction [Ref. 30] he was now to be the:
"Executive Manager throughout the Department of the Navy to provide,
operate and maintain adequate and secure naval communications and
to ensure their readiness and operating efficiency to support require-
ments for command and control and information transfer systems of
the operating forces and shore establishment of the Department of the
Navy; to be the Navy Operating Manager for the operation and main-
tenance support of those elements of the Defense Communications
System assigned to the Navy; to command and support the Naval Com-





III. THE EXECUTIVE MANAGER
A. DEFINITION
A single concise definition of the term "Executive Manager" has not
been found. Taken seperately the words can be defined. Webster de-
fines "executive" as "a person, group of people, or branch of government
empowered and required to administer the laws and affairs of a nation"
or "any person whose function is to administer or manage affairs, as of
a corporation, school, etc." and a "manager" as "a person who manages."
JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, does not define
either "executive" or "manager" but does define an "Executive Agent for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff" as "A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
whom they have assigned responsibility and delegated authority which
would otherwise be exercised by them collectively, to carry out for them
certain of their duties." JCS Pub 1 also defines a "coordinating authority"
as "A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating
specific functions of activities. He has the authority to require consul-
tation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to
compel agreement. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agree-
ment, he shall refer the matter to the appointing authority.
"
The OPNAV Organization Manual has an associated glossary which
defines an "Executive Agency" as the "Department or other administrative
unit which holds a position of administrative or managerial responsibil-
ity." The term "manager" is defined as "to direct, plan, develop,
16

organize, guide, coordinate, and control all aspects of execution and all
resources available to achieve objectives. To administer in the broadest
sense of overall control. (This verb implies responsibility for all aspects
of an operation or activity.)"
Still, a question remains. Where does the executive find himself in
the organization? Civilian managers seem to like to call themselves
executives when they are still early in their careers. Dalton McFarland
[Ref. 12, p. 71] clearly points out the problem when he states:
"The terms manager, executive, administrator, entrepreneur, and
businessman refer to closely related concepts. So closely are the
concepts related, in fact, that some of the terms are used inter-
changeably despite technical differences among them. None of the
terms have precise, universal definitions at present. The terms are
so imprecise that it is virtually impossible to obtain an accurate
count of the number of persons in different categories."
McFarland goes on to state that the main prevalent distinction among
the three terms, "manager," "executive," and "administrator" are in the
level and type of organization in which the usage occurs. He also states
that even these distinctions are not clearcut and that the concepts of the
executive and the administrator both imply policy-formulation levels.
It is clear from extensive reading of current management literature
and military instructions that an "Executive Manager", per se, is nowhere
defined. The best that can be done then is to develop a concept of an
Executive Manager based on what is available. This concept must in-
clude an element of delegated authority, which cuts across established
organizational lines, near top-level or policy formulating level position-
ing and responsibility for the administration of all aspects of an operation
17

or activity. Using this concept of the Executive Manager it is now ap-
propriate to examine the need for such an individual with regard to Naval
Communications.
B. NEED
Although the needs for increased emphasis on communications manage-
ment were previously discussed it would be well to again review these
needs as they relate to the role of Executive Manager.
The establishment of a telecommunications advisor in the office of
the President and the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Telecommunications demonstrate a trend toward centralizing manage-
ment. These centralized managers reflect the concern over communica-
tions matters which is found at the highest levels of the Executive and
Legislative branches of government. This interest requires a positive
identification of all communications resources. Unfortunately communi-
cations responsibilities in the Navy are so scattered that attempts to
identify communications resources to date have not been noted for their
success. For example on 21 May 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Packard established the Office of Assistant to the Secretary of De-
fense (Telecommunications o) Mr. Packard testified before the House
Armed Services Investigating committee [Ref. 19, p. 17] that:
"Shortly after he took office, he became aware that the Depart-
ment of Defense had a serious problem in the management of




communications. He found responsibility fragmented, and a need for
centralized authority and control of resources. He said there was no
place where he could learn how much was being spent on communica-
tions, and that there was no appropriate means for coordinating the
substantial portion of communications under control of the military
departments.
"
One of the problems is to account for the costs of the communications
integral to a weapons system. The House Armed Services Investigating
Committee report states the services were unable to "even approximate"
the cost of communications delivered with a weapons system. The report
\
states [Ref. 19, p. 21] "six billion dollars for total communications costs
is much more realistic than the three billion dollar figure usually cited by
the Department of Defense" and that "loose management practices in the
Department of Defense resulted in a complete loss of control over com-
munications assets."
The fact that responsibility for communication is fragmented was re-
cognized by the CNO Industrial Advisory Committee on Telecommunications
(CIACT.) As part of their report issued in 1972 [Ref. 22, p. i] , this high
level committee of civilian and military officials stated that:
"The Navy's communications problems cannot be successfully solved
without first addressing this fragmentation. The responsibility for
all aspects of communications, ashore, on-board, and between plat-
forms should be consolidated and concentrated, for the office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) , in a Director of Naval Telecom-
communications (DNT); and, for the Office of the Chief of Naval
Material (NAVMAT)
,
in the Commander Naval Electronics Systems
Command (NAVELEX) .
"
Clearly these problem areas demonstrate the need for an Executive
Manager for Naval Communications. The fact that such an individual has
not been previously designated seems to be one of the most obvious
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reasons for the condition in which naval communications exists today.
A member of COMNAVCOMM staff likened it to a corporation ripe for take-
over by a conglomerate -- plenty of assets, offering a necessary service,
but badly mismanaged.
The term "Executive Manager" has been discussed. While no clear
concise meaning has been given to the term, a working concept has been
developed. Using this concept the need for an Executive Manager has
been set forth. At this point, a closer look at the various military organi-
zations for communications should assist in fixing in mind where an




A. THE PRESENT NAVY ORGANIZATION
To illustrate the fragmentation referred to in the previous section it
will be necessary to discuss the present organization of the Navy for
communications
.
The CNO staff (OPNAV) is organized in a matrix fashion. Vertical
platform sponsors such as OP-02, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Submarine Warfare), OP-03 , Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface
Warfare), and OP-05, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) in-
termesh with horizontal "mission sponsors such as OP-93, Director of
Tactical Electro-magnetic Programs, OP-094, Director Command Support
Programs, OP-095, Director of Antisubmarine Warfare Programs and OP-
098, Director of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation."
Acting for the Director, Command Support Programs (OP-094) , the
Director, Naval Communications Division is assigned the mission to
exercise centralized supervision and direction of the telecommunications
activities of the Navy; and to serve under the Director, Command Support
Programs as the principal staff advisor and provide support to CNO on
matters pertaining to telecommunications. Currently the OP-02, OP-03,
OP-05, OP-093 and OP-095 missions also include the authority and re-
sponsibility for telecommunications involved in their platforms and
systems. For example, one of OP-02's functions states [Ref. 23, p. 02-6]
that he, "Determines requirements, coordinates with and provides
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guidance to the Director, Command Support Programs, OP-094 , and other
OPNAV offices on command and control of, and communications systems
associated with, submarine forces and programs."
This obviously places OP-02 in a prominant position in communica-
tions. However, a fine line of distinction exists between his mission
and that of COMNAVCOMM. Acting in this capacity as a member of
CNO's staff, OP-02 is dealing in operational requirements for communica-
tions. The distinction becomes clear when it is observed that according
to his charter [Ref. 23, p. 094-22] OP-941 "assesses requirements"
and "plans for the satisfaction of current and future telecommunications
requirements. "
Similar tasking involving communications can be found in the mission
and functions statements of other OPNAV staff members „ OP-098 is
charged [Ref. 23, p. 098-23] to sponsor "jointly with the Director,
Naval Communications Division, OP-941, a Satellite Communications
Program Coordinator who is a focal point for all Navy efforts in the satel-
lite communications field and also to "carry out the responsibilities of
the Director, RDT&E for R&D matters related to communications, cryptology,
and the radio frequency spectrum. "
Without any reference to the responsibility or authority of OP-094 in
communications matters, OP-0 93 is charged with the "coordination of
TF/TG level command, control and communications requirements." A
subordinate, OP-931, is tasked [Ref. 23, p. 093-5] to develop a Navy-
wide Tactical Electro-magnetic Plan which will guide the integration of
22

weapon systems, sensor systems, electronic warfare systems, tactical
command and control and communications systems into an effective task
force system.
It seems reasonably clear that the intent of the words is to place re-
sponsibility for stating operational requirements, that is need lines,
with other mission and platform sponsors but to leave the matter of de-
ciding how these requirements are to be satisfied with OP-094. However,
the old story of giving an inch and taking a mile is no where better evi-
denced than here. The CIACT report [Ref. 22, p. 27] states that this
division of responsibility and authority of OPNAV "encourages the inde-
pendent design, development, and implementation of separate and fre-
quently incompatible communications systems and subsystems."
The director, Naval Communications Division (OP-941) also serves
as Commander, Naval Communications Command, reporting directly to
the CNO in this capacity. Other members of OP-941 staff are "double-
hatted" to COMNAVCOMM staff. In the report of inspection of the Head-
quarters Naval Communications Command in 1969 [Ref. 26, p. 1], the
Navy Inspector General stated "the double-hatting of OP-094 and
COMNAVCOMM has led to reduced effectiveness of the Naval Communi-
cations Command. This double-hatted relationship, combined with the
physical proximity of these two organizations, has resulted in COMNAV-
COMM' s over involvement in day-to-day OP-094 staff work. In fact, in
many areas OP-094 is using COMNAVCOMM' s Headquarters as an exten-




The CIACT found the same condition three years later and their re-
port [Ref. 22, p. 28] states, "the double hatting creates a situation
whereby NAVCOMMCOM is employed as an extension of the OPNAV
(OP-941) staff. This detracts from the objectivity and responsiveness of
each group and reduces the effectiveness of both groups."
Commander, Naval Communications Command is delegated command
and support responsibilities for Naval Communications Stations and Units,
Radio Stations and Communications Technical Groups. However, his
control over even these elements is not total. Authoritative direction and
control of naval communications broadcasts, ship/shore, air/ground, and
other designated tactical communications functions performed by activi-
ties of the Naval Communications Command is assigned to the Fleet
Commanders in Chief. This authoritative direction and control involves
the adequacy of the communications arrangements, the effectiveness of
the service rendered, and the responsiveness in satisfying the operating
requirements of the Operating Forces. COMNAVCOMM does not have a
representative assigned to the staff of the Fleet Commanders to assist in
this and there is no COMNAVCOMM field organization.
In addition to the communications stations, and units, a large number
of communications facilities have been developed and are operated out-
side the direct control of COMNAVCOMM. They include Tactical Support
Centers (TSC) , Operational Control Centers (OCC) , Naval Weather Ser-
vice facilities and Naval Air Station communications facilities.
24

Responsibility for communications matters is also found in several
areas and levels throughout the Naval Material Command. Shore communi-
cations responsibilities are assigned to Naval Electronics Systems Com-
mand. Responsibility for airborne communications system design, devel-
opment, and acquisition is assigned to Naval Air Systems Command. Re-
sponsibility for shipboard systems is split between Naval Ships System
Command and Naval Electronic Systems Command. At the same time,
COMNAVCOMM is given the mission to "provide ... Naval Communica-
tions." Taken in the literal sense this seems to imply involvement to
some degree in equipment design, development and procurement areas.
As the CIACT report [Ref. 22, p. 29] states, "Concentration of communi-
cations material matters in a single organization is essential for properly
controlled R&D and acquisition, and to prevent wastefully redundant ef-
fort and proliferation of non-compatible subsystems and equipments."
Communications research and development is carried out by a number
of offices scattered throughout the Navy and by certain civilian con-
tractors. Prominent in this effort, are the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research and Development), Office of the Director, Research, Develop-
ment, Test, and Evaluation (OP-098) on CNO's-staff, Naval Electronics
Laboratory Center (NELC)'and Naval Research Laboratory. OP-094 is
tasked to advise OP-098 of the requirements for research, development,
test and evaluation relating to Command Support Programs and to ensure
that the resulting systems are adequate and responsive to long range ob-
jectives, immediate requirements, and fiscal limitations and advancing
25

technology. COMNAVCOMM is tasked to initiate action to include naval
communications requirements in the Navy Planning and Programming System,
including the research and development effort. The Naval Electronics
Laboratory Center is designated the Navy's "lead laboratory" for communi-
cations, but it only has a small portion of the total effort. It is obvious
that as a result of overlapping tasking and fragmented responsibilities
communications systems have developed which are not compatible and
not responsive to Navy needs.
Figure 1 , illustrates the command relationships involved in navy com-
munications. Of interest are the multitude of commands involved and the
fact that COMNAVCOMM, the designated Executive Manager for Naval
Communications throughout the Department of the Navy is really isolated.
His lines of communication to most of the elements involved are not
direct. As a result it is not difficult to see how confusion as to the pre-
dominance of his position has developed.
B. ARMY AND AIR FORCE
The Army Strategic Communications Command was established on
1 March 1964 by Department of the Army General Order #6 of 28 February
1964, to engineer, install, operate and maintain communications for the
Army and for other agencies, as directed by the Chief of Staff, U. S.
Army. The Commanding General, STRATCOM commands the U. S. Army
Strategic Communications Command from Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and is





























maintains a sizeable subordinate field organization, with subordinate
STRATCOM elements double-hatted with operational Army components
down to the theater level.
The Air Force Communications Service was established 1 July 1961
and is designated as a "Major Air Command." The Air Force Communica-
tions Service with headquarters at Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri is or-
ganized to provide, operate and maintain communications and flight
facilities and to provide air traffic control services for the Air Force and
other agencies as directed by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force. The
Commander, Air Force Communications Service reports directly to the
Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force. Again, as with the Army, the Air Force
Communications Service maintains a sizeable field organization with sub-
ordinate AFCS elements generally double-hatted with operational Air Force
components down to the squadron level.
Both AFCS and STRATCOM utilize their large field organizations as a
mechanism to ensure responsiveness to their operational component com-
manders. The USAF appears to carry their double-hatted arrangement
further down the chain of command than the Army. Neither the Army nor
the Air Force double-hats the Commander of their communications organi-
zations with the position of staff communications-electronics officer on
the Army and Air Force Staffs despite the general double-hatting down
the line.
Both the Army and the Air Force have integral to their communications
organizations, an extensive material capability. For example the
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engineering and installation role in the Air Force was recently combined
with the operation and maintenance role by removing the USAF Ground
Engineering Installation Agency from the Air Force Logistics Command and
merging it into the Air Force Communications Service. STRATCOM has a
subordinate organization, the Communications Electronics Engineering In-
stallation Agency (CEEIA) located at Fort Huachuca to provide centralized
control of STRATCOM 1 s global engineering and installation activities.
Clearly, the Army and Air Force organizations are considerably dif-
ferent from the Navy organization. The idea of extension of the command
through the double-hatted lower eschelons is in sharp contrast to the
Washington based headquarters concept of the Navy. Additionally, the
Army and Air Force organizations, located as they are outside the Wash-
ington area seem to enjoy the prestige of an autonomous command. Some-
thing that apparently Headquarters, NAVCOMMCOM does not.
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V. AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY RELATIONSHIPS
A. AUTHORITY
Before proceeding into the relationships between authority and re-
sponsibility, it would first be helpful to examine the current textbook
viewpoints concerning the source of authority. One of the earliest writers
in the field of management, Henri Fayol, defined authority as the right to
give orders and the power to exact obedience. He distinguished between
official authority, which is based on the office a person holds and per-
sonal authority which is based on the office holder's own personality,
experience and other personal characteristics which influence his sub-
ordinates. Current writers generally concur that authority in bureaucratic
organizations is inherent to the position in the organization and not in the
person who fills the position. However, some disagreement has developed
on the matter of the source of authority with some experts adhering to the
formal authority theory and others to an acceptance theory. Formal
theorists consider authority to have its origins in basic social behavior
— groups form laws, mores, and customs to routinize their continued
existence. Social institutions develop to carry out this routinized be-
havior. Formal authority is the right these social institutions confer on
individuals to manage the political, economic, religious or educational
institution concerned. Under this concept in the United States, authority
is ultimately traced back to the Constitution.
The acceptance theory of authority states that the real source of a
manager's authority is the acceptance by subordinates of the power a
30

manager holds over them. This theory is generally attributed to Chester
Bernard and it is his position that a subordinate will accept the authority
of a command if he understands it, if he believes it is consistent with
the organization's purpose and compatible with his own interests, and if
he is mentally and physically able to comply with it.
Not all management experts accept this theory. Koontz and O'Donnell
[Refo 11, p. 59] take the position that:
"The very fact that some of the most important advantages of
accepting, and disadvantages of not accepting, authority arise from
the manager's power to grant or with-hold rewards or, to dismiss
the subordinate, makes the theory unreal. The soldier's obedience
to commands -- because the alternative is the guardhouse or the
firing squad -- is hardly genuine acceptance, nor is acceptance
more genuine where a civilian's acceptance alternative is to quit
his job or be fired .
"
In the case at hand however, where lateral relationships abound more
so than classical line command relationships and where the problem is
one of establishing the authority of COMNAVCOMM through these lateral
relationships the question of acceptance really is noticeable. Obviously
COMNAVCOMM can't fire the Chief of Naval Material or Commander,
Naval Electronics System Command. He must gain their acceptance of his
authority none the less.
The fact that lateral acceptance of authority is a problem is observed
in the following quotation from an article concerning the formation of the
Command Support Programs office [Ref. 18].
"As with any bureaucratic reorganization, the shift was not
entirely painless. "There were some cries of outrage," one ob-
server said. "Some of the admirals in charge of certain elements
had their own budgets and didn't like people from the new organi-
zation threatening their control.
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"We've had to go around and take a few grains of rice from
everybody's bowl and some of them were inclined to break our
chopsticks when we went after their rice."
It is inevitable that as COMNAVCOMM exerts the authority of an Exe-
cutive Manager for Naval Communications throughout the Department of
the Navy he will encounter similar problems.
B. RESPONSIBILITY
Basically two schools of thought exist with regard to responsibility.
One holds that responsibility means the work or duties someone is to
accomplish and that superiors can and do delegate responsibility when
they assign work. The other school holds that responsibility is the ob-
ligation of a subordinate to perform assigned and implied duties and that
responsibility can never be delegated. The obvious problem in under-
standing this concept is that if responsibility cannot be delegated how
does anyone below the highest level attain it? The answer is that re-
sponsibility is an obligation. As duties are assigned, authority is passed
on and this generates its own responsibilities. The sense of being ac-
countable for action.
This approach follows the concept of responsibility which is incul-
cated in naval officers. For example the captain of a ship may authorize
certain officers to perform action such as operation and maintenance of
the engineering plant or conning the ship but he retains the responsibility
for the proper execution of these functions -- he is still responsible and
accountable to the commodore. In this light then, what of the authority
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and responsibility that is involved with the "Executive Manager" for
naval communications.
An interesting and important insight into use of the term "Executive
Manager" and the authority and responsibility relationships it implies is
found in SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5400.13 of 24 August 1971. This instruc-
tion has as its subject "Assignment and Distribution of Authority and Re-
sponsibility for the Administration of the Department of the Navy. " One
section of this instruction lists those offices which are considered to
deal with Executive Administration. They include, the Secretary of the
Navy, the Civilian Executive Assistants to the Secretary, the Chief of
Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. , the Chief of
Naval Material, the Chief of Naval Personnel, the Chief, Bureau of Medi-
cine and Surgery, the Chief of Naval Research, the Judge Advocate
General, the Deputy Comptroller of the Navy, and the Staff Assistants to
the Secretary. The instruction specifically states that the term "Navy
Department" refers to the central executive offices of the Department of
the Navy located at the seat of the government. The instruction goes on
to state that the Navy Department is organizationally composed of the
above listed offices. The Commander, Naval Communications Command
is not mentioned. In fact the word "communications" is used only one
time when it is stated that the Chief of Naval Operations shall exercise
overall authority throughout the Department of the Navy in matters essen-




This presents some interesting questions. Since this instruction post
dates OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5450.184, is the assignment of an Executive
Manager in that instruction misplaced? Does the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions have the authority to name an eschelon two commander an "Execu-
tive Manager" throughout the Department of the Navy? If it was the in-
tent of the Secretary of the Navy that Commander, Naval Communications
Command be included in Executive Administration of the Navy as some
other eschelon two commanders were, then why didn't" the mission state-
ment of SECNAV NOTICE 5450 of 19 April 1967 contain the term Executive
Manager or why was Commander, Naval Communications Command not
specifically referred to, as some other eschelon two commanders were in
SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5400.13?
Only one other case has been located where the authority to act as
an Executive Manager has been delegated. This is the case of the Exe-
cutive Manager for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training
(OP-03X.) The mission of this officer on OPNAV staff clearly states
[Ref. 23, p. 03-15] that he is to:
".
. .act under the authority of and be responsible to the
Secretary of the Navy through the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Surface Warfare) for the implementation of the
responsibilities of the Secretary of the Navy in all matters
pertaining to his assignment as Single Manager for Explo-
sive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training within the
Department of Defense."
The main point to be observed here is that an "Executive Manager"
has been established to carry out an activity for the Secretary of the
Navy. Although not specifically referred to in SECNAV INSTRUCTION
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5400.13 the assignment of an Executive Manager in the OPNAV staff ap-
pears to be consistent with that instruction since the Chief of Naval
Operation is considered to be involved in Executive Administration, and
OP-03X's mission states he is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy.
His positioning, and the clear mission he is assigned, would seem to




The need for some form of overall management of naval communica-
tions has been discussed. It has been observed that numerous elements
and levels of command in the Navy provide some form of input into the
total communications picture and that as a result of this fragmentation
the resulting communications are not always responsive to the needs of
the operating forces. It appears that despite the development of the
Command Support Programs office it is still the intention of the Secretary
of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations that there be separate
centralized management of communications matters.
While it is the conclusion of this thesis that such management is
necessary, it is also concluded that the term Executive Manager as pre-
sently assigned to COMNAVCOMM does not conform to the concepts for
assignment and distribution of authority and responsibility as defined in
SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5400.13. Two alternative solutions are available.
One involves moving the Executive Manager to the eschelon one level —
removing the title from COMNAVCOMM and placing it with OP-941.
This is not considered acceptable since it will impose, unnecessarily,
operation and maintenance functions on OPNAV staff. It should be the
function of this staff to deal in requirements -- a course setting, direc-
tive approach.
The second alternative involves drastic modification of COMNAV-
COMM's position The double-hatting of OP-941 and COMNAVCOMM
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should be ended. Naval Communications Command, Headquarters should
be removed from the Washington D. C. area to lessen the tendency of
that headquarters to become an extension of OP-941. Subordinate field
headquarters should be established similar to the Army and Air Force con-
cept to avail COMNAVCOMM the opportunity of on the spot visibility,
decision-making and authority.
Finally, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5400.13 should be modified to indi-
cate the role COMNAVCOMM is to play in Executive Administration of the
Department of the Navy. Communications pervades all levels, all areas
of modern naval operations and as a result the Executive Manager for
Naval Communications should be given proper recognition and support by
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